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aversion in tourism destinations
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The author analyses the implications of crowding aversion and tourism aversion for the economic performance of tourism destinations
in the case of uncertain tourist inflows. He analytically characterizes
all possible scenarios, showing how different the preferences of tourists (towards crowding) and residents (towards tourism) interact and
affect the economic outcome. The paper shows that, when tourists
are crowding-averse (crowding lovers), uncertainty leads to deterioration (improvement) of economic performance, while it does not
affect performance at all when tourists are crowding-indifferent.
However, assessing how this will be reflected in welfare changes is
more complex, since it depends also on the degree of tourism aversion
among local residents.
Keywords: uncertainty; tourism specialization; crowding aversion;
tourism aversion
JEL classification: O40; O41

Tourism has recently been gaining more and more importance in modern
economies, both in developed and developing countries. Its (beneficial and
costly) effects on economic development are well-known and extensively documented (see Brida and Pulina (2010) for a recent survey). A large share of the
literature analyses the implications of tourism specialization for economic
development, both in the short run and long run, by applying econometric
techniques to conduct empirical investigations. Much smaller is the portion of
studies tackling the issue from a theoretical point of view (among others, see
Schubert (2010) and Schubert et al (2011)). In particular two main approaches
have been proposed to explain the relationship between tourism and growth:
the most popular uses dynamic models of trade to show that a terms of trade
effect determines whether growth and tourism move in the same direction
I am grateful to Paolo Figini and Natalie Stoeckl for insightful discussions giving birth to this work.
I wish also to thank the Editor of Tourism Economics, Stephen Wanhill, and one anonymous referee
for their constructive comments on an earlier draft of the paper. All errors and omissions are my
sole responsibility.
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(Hazari and Sgro, 1995; Lanza et al, 2003); a different and most recent approach
relies on hedonic prices to understand how residents’ choices may affect tourist
inflows, determining income and thus well-being (Cerina, 2007; Lozano et al,
2008). To the best of our knowledge, no study extends the analysis to consider
how the uncertainty about the evolution of tourism demand and tourist inflows
may affect the growth process of tourism destinations. This is absolutely
relevant if we consider that tourism evolution is to a large extent unpredictable,
and thus determining how to react to such randomness is essential to contrast
(exploit) eventual harmful (beneficial) events. In order to shed some light on
this issue, we follow the latter approach to consider how a stochastic tourism
dynamics will affect economic performance and well-being in tourism-based
economies.
Thus, the model we adopt relies on the framework proposed first by Cerina
(2007) and later analysed by Lozano et al (2008) and Marsiglio (2015). Specifically, we consider a small economy producing only tourism services, supplied
in an international tourism market populated by a large number of tourism
economies; the notion of tourism services should be interpreted as a bundle of
goods and services able to satisfy a wide range of tourism consumers (Candela
and Figini, 2010). The tourist flows come from the international market and
thus there is no distinction between resident and non-resident tourists. International demand for tourism is infinite at the price level corresponding to
tourists’ willingness to pay and nil for any other price level; thus, the equilibrium quantity of tourism is totally determined by the supply-side.1 Residents
are characterized as traditional macroeconomic household-firm agents, who wish
to maximize their lifetime utility given the dynamic evolution of tourism
capital and tourist inflows. This formalization of the tourism market is very
convenient, since it permits us to describe the tourism-economic problem as
a standard macroeconomic (Ramsey-type) problem.
We depart from Cerina’s (2007) approach in three different ways: we do
not consider environment for the sake of simplicity; we allow for the utility
of residents to depend also on the number of visitors entering the local
economy; we assume that tourist inflows follow a stochastic process. Not
considering environmental issues allows us to maintain the model as simple
as possible and to fully characterize the implications of uncertainty on economic performance and well-being. Moreover, this implies that tourists’
willingness to pay depends only on tourism services and the number of other
visitors present in the host country;2 this allows us to assess how a different
degree of crowding aversion may affect the economic outcome. Introducing
the number of tourists in the utility function of the residents captures three
alternative situations: residents enjoy, are indifferent to or are bothered by the
presence of international tourists in the local economy (see Meleddu (2014)
for a survey on residents’ welfare in tourism economies). Which of these
situations is most relevant may change from country to country according to
whether the (income) benefits from tourism specialization are larger than,
equal to or smaller than the associated perceived (economic, social and environmental) costs.3 Describing the evolution of tourist inflows as a random
process allows us to compare directly the stochastic and deterministic outcomes, understanding what is the role played by uncertainty on the development of tourism destinations.
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Given our framework, as will become clearer shortly, the nature of the
relationship between tourism specialization and economic development (and
well-being) is all but trivial. Indeed, two main factors, the aversion to crowding of international tourists and the aversion to tourism of local residents,
determine the net impacts of tourism development on the hosting community. To the best of our knowledge, an explicit investigation of the mutual
relationship between tourists and residents’ preferences is not present in the
literature, thus our paper represents a first attempt at filling this gap. The
presence of stochastic shocks on the evolution of international tourist inflows
complicates the picture even further. This brief paper proceeds as follows. The
stochastic optimization problem is introduced and analytically solved in the
next section, where we derive most of our results and we also analyse the
deterministic version of the model in order to compare its outcome with the
stochastic framework. The last section, as usual, contains concluding remarks
and directions for future research. Most of the technicalities are presented in
the Technical Appendix.

The model
The model is a standard Ramsey (1928) model of optimal growth where the
social planner seeks to maximize the (expected) welfare of the society (that is,
the residents) taking into account the economic and tourism dynamics. The
welfare is the infinite discounted (ρ is the pure rate of time preference) sum
of instantaneous utilities; the utility function is assumed to be isoelastic in its
two arguments, consumption, C(t), and tourists number, N(t): u(C(t), N(t)) =
1–θ
N(t)ε (1–θ) –1 , where θ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
C(t)
———————
1–θ
of substitution and ε ∈[–1,1] represents the weight of tourism in residents’
preferences; a negative (positive) value of ε represents the case in which residents
suffer (enjoy) the presence of international visitors. Thus, ε measures the degree
of tourism aversion of local residents: if ε > 0 residents are tourism lovers, if
ε > 0 tourism indifferent while if ε > 0 tourism-averse. The tourist inflow is
stochastic and is driven by a geometric Brownian motion: dN(t) = µN(t)dt +
σN(t)dW(t), where µ > 0 is the drift and σ ≥ 0 the variance parameter, while
dW(t) is the increment of a Wiener process. The economic constraint is given
by the law of motion of tourism capital, which igiven by the difference between
·
residents’ income, Y(t), and consumption: K(t) = Y(t) – C(t). As in Cerina
(2007), income totally depends upon tourism revenues, which are given by the
product between tourists’ willingness to pay for and the quantity of tourism
services exchanged on the market. The willingness to pay depends on the stock
of tourism services, K(t), and the number of tourists in the tourism destination,
and it is assumed to take a Cobb–Douglas form, P(t) = AK(t) α
N(t)–β, where α ∈(0,1) and β ∈(–1,1) measure tourists’ sympathy toward tourism
facilities and other visitors in the tourism destination, respectively.4 In particular, if β > 0 tourists are crowding averse, if β = 0 crowding indifferent and if
β < 0 crowding lover. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that each tourist
buys one unit of tourism services, such that Y(t) = AK(t)α N(t)1–β.
Taking initial conditions, K(0) and N(0), as given, the planning problem in
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the tourism-based economy consists of choosing the consumption level, considering the dynamic evolution of tourism capital and tourists number:5
,

(1)

,

(2)

.

(3)

Note that, in our model, the number of tourists is an auxiliary variable; thus
it is totally irrelevant for sufficiency issues related to the dynamic optimization problem. If this were not the case, we would need to impose some
parameter restriction in order for the maximization problem to be concave,
as in Marsiglio (2015). From the previous problem it is clear that the uncertainty about tourist numbers affects the well-being of the residents both
directly and indirectly. Indeed, tourist numbers influence their instantaneous
utility function (what we may label ‘utility effect’), and determines the size
of the tourism revenue (what we may refer to as ‘income effect’). These two
effects move in the same or opposite direction according to the type of
preferences of both the residents (towards tourism, ε) and international tourists (towards crowding, β).
Define J(K,N) as the maximum expected value associated with the above
stochastic optimization problem.6 The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation reads as:
,

(4)

where subscripts denote partial derivatives of J with respect to the variables of
interest. Differentiating Equation (4) with respect to consumption gives the
following first order condition:
,

(5)

which substituted back into Equation (4) yields:

(6)
By applying the guess and verify method to the previous equation, it is possible
to show that a closed form solution to the problem exists under a particular
combination of parameter values (the proofs of the following propositions are
presented in the Technical Appendix).
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Proposition 1. Assume that θ = α; then (6) has a solution given by:
,

(7)

where:

Moreover the optimal consumption path is:
c(t) = ΩK(t),

(8)

while the optimal path of tourism capital is:
,

where

(9)

.

Equation (8) states that at equilibrium there is a linear relationship between
the optimal level of consumption and tourism capital. This result and the
underlying assumption (the tourists’ sympathy toward tourism facilities equals
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution) are standard in this
stochastic optimization setup7 (Smith, 2007). Equation (9) describes the relationship between the stock of tourism capital and the number of tourists, which
is crucially affected by the degree of crowding aversion of international tourists
and the presence of randomness in the evolution of tourist inflows.
In order to assess the impact of uncertainty on the economic performance
of the tourism destination, we need to understand how the tourism capital stock
relates to the degree of crowding aversion and the stochastic process driving
the evolution of tourist numbers over time. In particular, by relating to Jensen’s
inequality, we can compare the deterministic and the stochastic outcomes of the
model. Indeed the sign of β directly determines whether the random process
N(t) is subject to a concave, convex or linear transformation in Equation (9),
which allows us to directly contrast [N(t)1–β] and ( [N(t)])1–β. It is then
straightforward to compare economic performance (as measured by the tourism
capital stock, K(t)1–α) in the stochastic and deterministic framework. It is
therefore possible to prove that:
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Proposition 2. Uncertainty tends to improve the economic performance of a tourism
destination whenever tourists are crowding lovers (β < 0), while it tends to reduce its
economic performance whenever tourists are crowding-averse (β > 0). Instead, if tourists
are crowding-indifferent (β = 0) then uncertainty does not affect economic performance.
Proposition 2 shows how uncertainty, the type of preferences of international
tourists and economic performance (of a tourism destination) are related. If the
crowding aversion parameter is positive then uncertainty will be harmful for
the economy, if it is negative then uncertainty will benefit the economy, while
if it is null uncertainty will not have any influence at all on the economic
outcome. Note that using consumption or income as an indicator of economic
performance rather than tourism capital will not change the results since from
Equation (8) there is a one-to-one relationship between consumption and
capital, and income monotonically rises with capital. In terms of policy implications, this result suggests that uncertainty about the evolution of tourism does
not necessarily hurt the economic system of tourism destinations, and assessing
the direction of these effects requires a careful consideration of the characteristics of international tourists’ preferences, which determine how income and
uncertainty are related (through the income effect).
Note that economic performance and well-being are different and not necessarily positively related, since social welfare depends both on consumption and
tourists number. Thus, in order to understand how uncertainty will impact the
well-being of residents we need to understand how Equation (1) is affected by
tourism shocks. In particular, the sign of β and ε determine whether the income
and utility effects move in the same or opposite direction, and the magnitude
of these parameters determines which of the two effects dominates. When they
move in the same direction it is straightforward to assess their impact on wellbeing; when they do not the net effect depends on which effect dominates
(further details can be found in the Technical Appendix). This result can be
summarized as follows.
Proposition 3. The effect of uncertainty on the well-being of the local residents of a
tourism-based economy depends on two factors: the sign and magnitude of the crowding
aversion (β) and the tourism aversion (ε) parameters.
Proposition 3 shows that assessing the welfare effects of tourism shocks is
particularly complex. The relationship between well-being and uncertainty
depends on the preferences of two different types of agents: residents and
international tourists. In the case in which residents are tourism-averse or
indifferent, it is relatively easy to evaluate the direction of welfare effects (apart
from the crowding averse case). In the case in which residents are tourism lovers,
disentangling the impact of randomness on well-being is much more complex
and requires precise knowledge of the size of the crowding aversion and tourism
aversion parameters (see the Appendix). Note that these results are derived in
a framework where ε is simply a parameter, and thus constant over time.
However as explained by Doxey’s (1975) Irridex model and Butler’s (1980)
tourist area life cycle model, residents’ perception of benefits and costs is likely
to change over time according to the stage of tourism development.8 Thus, in
reality, when ε endogenously evolves over time, assessing net welfare effects will
be even more difficult.
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The deterministic case: σ = 0
We now briefly look at what we can add to our previous conclusions by
analysing a special case of the model, that is the deterministic case, namely
σ = 0. If uncertainty does not play any role tourist inflows grow over time at
·
an exogenous (and strictly positive) rate, µ: N(n) = µN(t). In such a framework,
it is possible to analytically derive the solution of Equation (9):

From the previous equation it is clear that in the long run tourism capital, and
thus economic performance, will continue to rise for any β ∈(–1,1), as long as
the trend of tourist inflows, µ, is positive. Indeed, there is a one-to-one
relationship between the growth in tourist inflows and the economic growth
rate, since along the balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium9 we have:
γN = µ > 0,

(10)

1–β
(1 – β )µ
γ = γK = γC = γY = —— γN = ———– > 0,
1–α
1–α

(11)

where γN, γK, γC and γY represent the growth rate of tourist inflows, tourism
capital, consumption and income, respectively. It is definitely more interesting
to understand the nature of the relationship between increases in tourist inflows
and residents’ well-being in a deterministic framework. Since in such a case it
is possible to explicitly compute also social welfare:

this requires only to determine the sign of the following derivative:
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By analysing the previous expression it is clear that ∂W/∂μ > 0, ∀β ∈(–1,1)
as long as ε ≥ 0. When ε < 0, instead, ∂W/∂μ < 0 if ε ≥ – (1–β)/(1–α), while
the sign of ∂W/∂μ is ambiguous whenever ε > – (1–β)/(1–α). In this latter case,
the impact of µ on well-being depends on the magnitude of several parameters;
in particular, not only the type of preferences of tourists (α and β) or the kind
of preferences of residents (ε), but also the stage of tourism development, in
terms of stock of tourism facilities and visitors number (K(0) and N(0)),
determine the net welfare effect. We have just proved the following result:
Proposition 4. In the deterministic case, increases in tourist inflows (that is, rises in
µ) lead to improvements in the well-being of the tourism destination whenever residents
are tourism lovers or indifferent (ε ≥ 0). If residents are tourism-averse (ε < 0), this
may or may not be the case according to the stage of tourism development (K(0) and
N(0)), the size of the crowding aversion (β) and the tourism aversion (ε) parameters.
The results highlighted by Proposition 4 are intuitive: when residents are
not bothered by the presence of visitors an increase in their number will
generate higher profits improving residents’ well-being; when they are tourismaverse, this is not so obvious and other factors need to be taken into account.
Moreover, Proposition 4 provides some theoretical foundation to the literature
emphasizing how residents’ acceptance of tourism development is crucial for the
long-term success of tourism in a specific destination (Andriotis and Vaughan,
2003). However, this is only one possibility for tourism growth to be reflected
in improvements in residents’ well-being, since it represents the case in which
income and utility effects move in the same direction, increasing welfare. Note
that a similar result may occur even if residents are averse to tourism and ε
is not too small (see the Appendix); this case refers to the situation in which
the income effect more than offsets the (negative) utility effect, thus overall
increasing well-being. This suggests that, if the aim of policymakers in tourism
destinations is not only to improve economic performance but also steadily to
increase residents’ welfare, several elements need to be considered to identify
the appropriate policy tools to achieve such a goal. Most of the studies in
tourism economics do not consider the possible interactions between residents’
and tourists’ preferences, and consequently the derived policy recommendations
often lack a global view of the complex relationship between tourism activities
and the hosting economy.

Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the relationship between the uncertainty and preferences of both local residents and international tourists in tourism destinations.
We develop a stylized model that allows us to assess how economic development
due to tourism specialization will be affected by the randomness in tourist
inflows and thus in tourist numbers. We show that the degree of crowding
aversion (in tourists’ preferences) determines whether economic performance
will be enhanced, unaffected or lowered by such an uncertainty, and this is
related to the sign of the income effect. However, how such changes in economic
outcomes will be reflected in welfare variations is more complex and depends
also on the degree of tourism aversion (in residents’ preferences), which deter-
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mines the sign of the utility effect. This means that understanding how a
tourism-based economy should respond to increasing uncertainty about future
tourism developments in order to improve the well-being of its inhabitants is
not simple and requires a broad range of information (that is, whether the
income or utility effect is larger). We also consider the deterministic case in
order to assess how tourism development will affect residents’ welfare in the
absence of uncertainty. We show that, if residents are tourism lovers or indifferent, then their well-being will rise as tourism increases, while if they are
tourism-averse this may or may not happen according to the magnitude of
several parameters, related to preferences (of both tourists and residents) and
the stage of tourism development. Thus, even when uncertainty is not an issue,
disentangling how the income and utility effects impact residents’ well-being
is all but trivial.
Note that our analysis so far has been intentionally simple in order to stress
how any kind of economic evaluation becomes more complex when uncertainty
is also taken into account. However, the need for such a simplistic approach
precludes us from analysing both environmental and sustainability matters
related to tourism specialization, and heterogeneity issues in the characteristics
of tourist and resident agents. Thus, it is natural to wonder whether and how
our results will change in such more complicated contexts. Moreover, our
analysis has been purely theoretical, and it would be interesting to test the
model empirically. In particular, the investigation of how tourists’ willingness
to pay for (avoiding) crowding affects residents’ well-being (through the utility
effect) is essential in order to prescribe policy recommendations aiming to
increase not only economic performance but also social welfare. These further
extensions are left for future research.
Endnotes
1. We are well aware of the limitations of this assumption. However, introducing also a demand
side in such a dynamic context would complicate dramatically the model (which results to be
already not trivial because of the presence of uncertainty), and it would no longer be possible
to obtain analytical solutions.
2. Mcconnell and Sutinen (1984) first point out how tourism growth (in the sense of increasing
number of visitors) may reduce tourist inflows when tourists are averse to crowding and facilities
are congested (that is, the tourism product is a snob good). Several papers attempt to measure
visitors’ perceptions about crowding; the empirical results are mixed (Price and Chambers, 2000,
and references therein), and so it is important to understand whether and how the results differ
when tourists are crowding averse or crowding lovers.
3. Tourism development may generate costs, such as increased pressure on fragile environments,
erosion of sites, unwelcome sociocultural effects, road congestion and the crowding out of
attractions (Dwyer and Forsyth, 1997). However, tourism activity may also bring benefits, such
as greater awareness of the local environment and culture, conservation of man-made monuments
and wildlife preservation (Norton and Roper-Lindsay, 1992). How these benefits and costs are
perceived by residents is not obvious, and may change over time. Several papers point out how
some local communities have rejected tourism (Aziz, 1995; Sindiga, 1996) while others have
embraced it (Wilson, 1994; Oakes, 1999).
4. Alternatively, the parameters α and β can be interpreted in terms of price elasticity of demand
for tourism services.
5. Given Cerina’s (2007) specification of tourism activities, the model resembles to a large extent
a canonical economic growth Ramsey-type problem, in which K(t) would be traditionally
interpreted as physical capital and N(t) as population size.
6. See Chang (2004) for a detailed description of the procedures and methods we may use to solve
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stochastic maximization problems. Explaining how to derive and obtain an analytical solution
to the HJB equation is beyond the scope of this paper. What we want to stress here, by providing
a straightforward application, is that stochastic optimization can be used also to provide
interesting insights on tourism-related problems.
7. Note that in the economic growth literature, Y(t) is mainly interpreted as output while α and
β as factor shares. Thus, the condition θ = α states an equality between the capital share and
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Such a restriction is needed when a
production input evolves randomly, and this may be the case of technology (Smith, 2007) or
labour (Marsiglio and La Torre, 2012a, 2012b).
8. The Irridex (irritation index) model describes how the irritation of residents increases as the
number of tourists increases; four stages (euphoria, apathy, irritation and antagonism) are
identified, and each stage corresponds to a different number of visitors and a different level of
integration between residents and tourists. Similarly, the tourist area life cycle model states that
there is a correlation between resident’ attitudes and the different phases of development
experienced by tourism destinations.
9. A BGP equilibrium is defined as a situation in which all variables grow at constant (and possibly
positive) rates.
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Technical Appendix
In order to derive an explicit solution for the HJB equation, as in (6), we need
first to express our guess. Our educated guess (see Smith, 2007) in this
framework may take the following form:
J(K, N) = ξ1Kλ1Nλ2 + ξ2Kλ3 + ξ3.

(12)

Substituting its derivatives with respect to K and N into (6), yields:

Now suppose that: λ1 = 1 – θ = 1 – α, θ = α, λ2 = ε(1 – θ) = ε(1 – α)
and λ3 = ε(1 – α) + 1 – β; then we will have:

Therefore, for this equation to be verified at each time, t = 0,…,∞, the square
brackets need to vanish and this may happen when the parameters ξ1, ξ2, ξ3,
take the values determined in Proposition 1. The optimal rule for consumption,
as in Equation (8), is obtained by replacing JK and JN into Equation (5) with
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their expressions from Equation (12). Then by substituting Equation (8) into
the state equation, we get:
·
K(t) = AK(t)αN(t)1–β = ΩK(t),
which is a (stochastic) Bernoulli-type differential equation. Its solution is given
in Proposition 1. Finally, the transversality condition requires that limt→∞ E
[e–ρ tJ(K, N)] = 0, which because of our guess reads as:

In order for this expression to hold, we need to analyse how the value of β affects
the previous equation, and the involved expected values. A sufficient condition
for the three terms in the previous equation to converge to zero independently
of the value of β is φ ≡ [ε(1 – α) + 2] µ + ½σ 2[ε(1 – α) + 2][ε(1 – α) + 1]
– ρ < 0. Note that the unique role of the technical condition φ < 0 is to ensure
that the transversality condition is met, ruling out explosive paths.
In order to contrast the stochastic and deterministic version of the model,
we need to understand how N1–β behaves when subject to shocks and when not.
By Jensen’s inequality, we know that for χ = 1 – β ∈ (0,1), that is when β >
0, the random process N under a strictly concave transformation will show
[N(t)χ] < ( [N(t)])χ; this implies that for K(t) we obtain:

For χ = 1 – β ∈ (1,2), namely when β < 0, the results are completely reversed;
the random process N under a strictly convex transformation will show [N(t)χ]
> ( [N(t)])χ; this implies that [K(t)1–α] ≥ ( [K(t)])1–α. Finally, for χ = 1 – β
= 1, that is as long as β = 0, we have a linear transformation which yields
[N(t)χ] = ( [N(t)])χ and thus [K(t)1–α] = ( [K(t)])1–α.
Provided that the parametric restriction in Proposition 1 is met, then the
expressions in Equations (8) and (9) hold for any t = 0,…,∞. Thus, taking into
account that the value function reads as in (7), by plugging (8) into (1), and
substituting (9) into the derived expression, the expected welfare reads as:

After some algebra, it is possible to show that the relationship between uncertainty and welfare depends on the sign of the following term: ψ ≡ µ[1 –
β + ε(1 – α)] + –21 σ 2{ε(1 – α)[ε(1 – α) – 1] – β(1 – β)}. Specifically, uncertainty
will increase or decrease welfare according to whether ∂ψ/∂σ is positive or
negative. Thus, it is convenient to analyse welfare implications of uncertainty
under three alternative scenarios:

Uncertainty, crowding aversion and tourism aversion
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Consider first that tourists are crowding lovers (β < 0). If residents are
tourism-averse or tourism-indifferent (ε ≤ 0), uncertainty will increase
welfare; if residents are tourism lovers (ε > 0), uncertainty will increase
welfare if ε is large enough (ε ≤ 1/(1–α)); otherwise how uncertainty and
welfare are related will depend on whether the income or the utility effect
prevails.
(ii) Consider the case in which tourists are crowding-indifferent (β = 0). If
residents are tourism-averse (ε < 0), uncertainty will increase welfare; if
residents are tourism-indifferent (ε = 0), uncertainty will not affect welfare;
if residents are tourism lovers (ε > 0), uncertainty will increase welfare if
ε is large enough (ε > 1/(1–α)), decrease welfare if it is small enough (ε
< 1/(1–α)), not affect welfare if ε = 1/(1–α).
(iii) Finally, consider the crowding-averse tourists case (β > 0). If residents are
tourism-averse (ε < 0), how uncertainty and welfare are related will depend
on whether the income or the utility effect is larger; if residents are
tourism-indifferent (ε = 0), uncertainty will decrease welfare; if residents
are tourism lovers (ε > 0), uncertainty will decrease welfare if ε is small
enough (ε ≤ 1/(1–α)), otherwise how uncertainty and welfare are related
will depend on whether the income or the utility effect prevails.
(i)

Intuitively, these results are related to the direction and intensity of the income
and utility effects.

